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— by Roger A. McEowen* 
Overview 
The ability to obtain a general utility patent on seed technology has led to cases in which 
farmers have been sued for misappropriation of the technology.  Because seed is 
reproducible, any farmer that saves seed is a natural competitor of a company that sells 
seed.1 But, for seed that is patented, the saved seed exemption of the PVPA2 is avoided, 
and the saving of seed can be prohibited. Indeed, under Technology Use Agreements for 
genetically modified seed presently in use, a farmer can use the seed for one-time planting, 
may not supply the seed to anyone else for planting, may not save any crop produced from 
the seed for replanting (or supply saved seed to anyone else for replanting) and must not 
use the seed or provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research, generation of herbicide 
registration data or seed production.3 
Clearly, a farmer signing a technology agreement is prohibited from saving seed subject 
to the agreement. But, what if the patented traits are present in the crops and/or resulting 
seed of a farmer that did not purchase or plant the patented seed?4 Has that farmer illegally 
infringed the patent even though having no intent to acquire the protected seed or infringe 
the patent? So far, courts have held that the process by which the patented seed arrives on 
a farmer’s land is irrelevant.5 But, the tide may be turning. 
The Innocent Infringer Defense - The Advent of a Doctrine of Equitable Enforcement 
of Patent Laws? 
The Canadian approach. In Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser,6 the Canadian Court 
of Appeals held that Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer, had infringed Monsanto’s patent on 
Roundup Ready canola by saving and replanting protected seed without a license.7 Schmeiser 
had not paid a license fee to use the technology and claimed that pollen drift from a 
neighbor’s fields or passing grain trucks had contaminated his fields.8 Schmeiser claimed 
that he did not knowingly acquire the technology or segregate the contaminated seeds nor 
spray his crop with Roundup.9 Indeed, Schmeiser had a long-standing farming practice of 
saving his own canola seed and replanting that saved seed the following year.  Thus, the 
initial sources of contamination were an inadvertent, but nonetheless unavoidable, result 
of a normal farming practice. However, the appellate court held that Schmeiser had infringed 
Monsanto’s patent because he either knew or should have known that the subject seeds 
were glyphosate resistant.10 
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After the appellate court’s opinion in Schmeiser,11 the 
Canadian Supreme Court rendered an opinion concerning the 
patentability of the so-called “Harvard Mouse.”12 In that case, 
the Court held that a mouse, as a higher life form, was not 
patentable under the specific wording of the Canadian Patent 
Act.13 The Court noted that the Canadian Patent Act provides 
for protection of intellectual property rights in the “making, 
constructing, and using [of an] invention and selling it to others 
to be used.”14 The Canadian Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case, with the key questions being whether the genes and cells 
of seeds and plants are covered by the Patent Act in spite of 
the wording of the statute, and whether plants and seeds are 
patentable in light of the Court’s earlier opinion in Harvard 
Mouse.15 
Upon review, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that plants, 
as a higher life form, are not patentable subject matter, but 
that the Monsanto patent at issue applied to the gene and was 
valid.16 Schmeiser was found to have infringed the patent 
because his “use” of the patented invention deprived Monsanto 
of the full enjoyment of the monopoly conferred by the patent. 
The Court noted that mere possession of a patented invention 
creates a rebuttable presumption of “use,” and that the intent 
of the alleged infringer may be relevant to rebutting the 
presumption. The Court reasoned that Schmeiser failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of “use” 
and had infringed Monsanto’s patent.  On the issue of damages, 
however, the court noted that the Patent Act only entitles the 
patentee whose patent has been infringed to the portion of the 
infringer’s profit which is casually attributable to the patented 
invention. Because Schmeiser earned no profit from infringing 
Monsanto’s patent,17 Monsanto was not entitled to damages. 
Thus, Schmeiser was not required to pay Monsanto any 
damages, penalties, court costs or the technology use fee of 
$15 per acre. Schmeiser, however, is barred from using 
Roundup Ready canola unless he pays a license fee, and must 
turn over any Roundup Ready seeds remaining in his 
possession.18 
Key U.S. ruling. Three weeks before the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Schmeiser,19 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Smithkline Beecham Corp. 
v. Apotex Corporation,20 invalidated a patent on a self-
reproducing antidepressant drug because previous clinical trials 
constituted a prior use.21 In the 1970s, a British company 
invented and patented paroxetine, an antidepressant drug. 
Eventually, the company developed a process to produce the 
crystalline hydrochloride salt of paroxetine, paroxetine 
hydrochloride (PHC). In 1980, Smithkline Beecham (SB) 
received a license for the technology and began manufacturing 
it. In the mid-1980s, an SB chemist created a new crystalline 
form of PHC known as PHC hemihydrate.22 SB was awarded 
a patent for PHC hemihydrate in 1988 and began marketing it 
as Paxil in 1993. In 1998, Apotex sought approval from the 
Food and Drug Administration to market its own PHC 
antidepressant drug with PHC anhydrate as the active 
ingredient. SB brought an infringement action against Apotex 
in 1998 claiming that Apotex was infringing its PHC 
hemihydrate patent by manufacturing PHC anhydrate tablets 
that necessarily contain, by processes of nature, trace amounts 
of PHC hemihydrate. 
The trial court23 found that the hemihydrate that SB created 
in 1984 had spread (i.e., seeded itself) to numerous 
manufacturing environments, including those of Apotex.  As a 
result, under normal conditions in a seeded environment, some 
of the original anhydrate converted spontaneously into the 
patented hemihydrate crystals. The court upheld the patent’s 
validity, but ruled that Apotex had not infringed the patent 
because its production processes had resulted in small, 
commercially insignificant amounts of hemihydrate.24 The trial 
judge specifically noted that failing to limit the scope of the 
patent would lead to inevitable infringement, and opined that 
it is a defense to a charge of patent infringement that the 
patentee caused the infringement. In the agricultural setting, 
that could mean that the judge would not hold a conventional 
(or organic) crop farmer liable for patent infringement when 
the reason for the presence of the patented traits in growing or 
harvested crops is cross-pollination, contamination from 
passing grain trucks or machinery, or simply because trace 
amounts of the patented genes and cells appear in conventional 
seed stocks.25 However, by establishing a patent infringement 
test of commercial significance, the judge apparently would 
require any commercially significant amounts of the patented 
technology to be given back to the patentee.26 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed 
with the trial court by noting that any amount of hemihydrous 
PHC produced (whether commercially viable or not) infringed 
the patent,27 but agreed that Apotex had not infringed the patent 
because SB’s clinical trials constituted a prior use.   As a result, 
the compound was already in the public domain, and SB’s 
patent was invalid. 
A concurring opinion reasoned that the patent was invalid 
not because of prior use of the subject matter, but because the 
subject matter was not patentable. The concurrence noted that 
man-made products or processes are patentable, but products 
that result from natural processes are not patentable.28 Thus, 
PHC would qualify for a patent because it is a man-made 
product, but because the original paroxetine anhydrate could 
naturally convert itself into the hemihydrate, the resulting PHC 
is not patentable. The judge compared the seeding and 
conversion process of PHC to the spread of patented, biotech 
seed traits via cross-pollination, and concluded that, “[T[he 
implication – that the patent owner would be entitled to collect 
royalties from every farmer whose cornfields contained even 
a few patented . . . stalks – cannot possibly be correct.” The 
judge went on to state, “. . . In short, patent claims drawn 
broadly enough to encompass products that spread, appear, and 
‘reproduce’ through natural processes cover subject matter 
unpatentable under Section 101 – and are therefore invalid.” 
Future Implications 
In any event, the trial judge’s comments in Smithkline 
Beecham,29 the Federal Circuit’s opinion (especially the 
concurrence) in the same case30 and, to a lesser extent, the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s opinion (particularly the dissent) 
in Schmeiser31 provide a framework for the development of 
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future cases and legislation supporting an equitable enforcement 
of patent laws respecting both the rights of patentees and the 
rights of innocent infringers. 
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